Abstract
I. Introduction
The
As stated by the Third Circuit:
An ADR is a receipt that is issued by a depositary bank that represents a specified amount of a foreign security that has been deposited with a foreign branch or agent of the depositary, known as the custodian. The holder of an ADR is not the title owner of the underlying shares; the tide owner of the underlying shares is either the depositary, the custodian, or their agent. ADRs are tradeable in the same manner as any other registered American security, may be listed on any of the major exchanges in the United States or traded over the counter, and are subject to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. This makes trading an ADR simpler and more secure for American investors than trading in the underlying security in the foreign market.
Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 2002) . By purchasing ADRs, a U.S. investor can gain ownership in the shares of a foreign company without the cross-border and currency inconveniences that the investor would encounter if he instead purchased the shares on a foreign exchange. ostensible value of the mortgage-servicing rights and that the National Australia defendants were aware of this deception. 30 The district court dismissed the claims by the American investor in National Australia's ADRs for failure to allege damages. 31 Because the American investor did not appeal, only
claims by the Australian investors in National Australia's ordinary shares traded on the ASX were further considered. 32 The district court then granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the acts in the United States were, "at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud scheme that culminated abroad."33 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, stating that the domestic acts did not "compris[e] the heart of the alleged fraud." 34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 35 As a threshold matter, the Court held that the extraterritorial reach of section 10(b) with regard to National Australia's conduct was a "merits" question under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6), not a subject-matter jurisdiction question under FRCP 12(b)(1).36 This "merits"-based approach constitutes a radical departure from the subjectmatter jurisdiction rationale that had been overwhelmingly embraced by the lower federal courts. 37 Perhaps equally as significant, the Supreme Court rejected the conduct and effects test. 38 In determining whether the plaintiffs had stated a claim, the Supreme Court emphasized that unless Congress clearly expresses its affirmative intention "to give a statute extraterritorial effect," then the statute has no such application. 39 The Court asserted that lower courts had disregarded this presumption against extraterritoriality by creating the conduct and effects test to "discern" whether Congress would have wanted a statute to apply.40 The Court explained the difficulties of applying the conduct and effects test, such as having to decipher the degree of activity that transpired in the United States. conduct and effects test, the Court reasoned that applying the presumption against extraterritoriality in all cases provides stability moving forward.42
Next, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress had legislated that section 10(b) applies abroad. 43 The Court held that the "general reference to foreign commerce in the definition of 'interstate commerce' does not defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality." 44 Congress's observations, when setting forth the purposes of the Exchange Act, that "transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest" and that the "prices established and offered in such transactions are generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign countries" also failed to overcome the presumption. 45 Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that section 30(b) of the Exchange Act-which specifically authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate regulations having extraterritorial application "to prevent ... evasion of the Exchange Act"-is evidence that the whole Exchange Act applies extraterritorially.46 Disagreeing, the Court concluded that section 30(b) appeared to be "directed at actions abroad that might conceal a domestic violation." 47 As an example of "a clear statement of extraterritorial effect," the Court focused on section 30(a) of the Exchange Act. 48 That statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer ... to make use of the mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of effecting on an exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction in any security the issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized under the laws of, or has its principal place of business in, a place within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe. 49 The Court noted that even where a statute, such as section 30(a), has some "extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision 42 . See Morrison,130 S. Ct. at 2881 (criticizing "judicial-speculation-made-law" applying U.S. extraterritorially). The Court also specifically disapproved of Leasco and Scboenbaum-the cases from which the Second Circuit developed its conduct and effects test. 48. Id. at 2883. The Court remarked that this provision providing for "a specific extraterritorial application would be quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to transactions on foreign exchanges." Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2010).
VOL. 46, NO. 3 to its terms." 5 0 The Court concluded that there was not a sufficient basis to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality for section 10(b). 51 Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that the extraterritorial reach of section 10(b) was immaterial in this instance because they only sought domestic application concerning the alleged financial manipulations and public statements of HomeSide that occurred in Florida. 52 In response, the Court commented:
Mt is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.
53
The Court thus reasoned that the Exchange Act focuses on purchases and sales of securities in the United States, not on the location where the deception occurs. Moreover, the Court stated that it knew of no one who thought the Exchange Act was meant to regulate foreign exchanges. Id. As for domestic purchases and sales, the Court referred back to section 30(a) and (b), noting that, in each instance, the foreign location of the transaction "establishes (or reflects the presumption of) the Act's inapplicability, absent regulations by the Commission." Id. at 2885. The Court rejected the Solicitor General's suggested test, which would have provided section 10(b) coverage when the "fraud involves significant conduct in the United States," primarily because the test lacked textual support. (1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.
60
According to floor comments made by the statute's sponsor, Representative Paul Kanjorski, section 929P sought to nullify the presumption against extraterritoriality of the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws with regard to government-brought actions by codifying the conduct and effects test repudiated by Morrison. 61 Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act mandated that the SEC perform a study and report to Congress within eighteen months on whether the test set forth in section 929P should be extended to private actions.
62
Congress therefore wrote a prescription to cure the ills of Morrison in the government enforcement setting. Whether Congress in fact prescribed the proper medicine is uncertain. In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that extraterritorial application was a matter of substantive law, not subject-matter jurisdiction. 63 Ignoring this rationale, Congress framed section 929P in terms of jurisdiction. Thus, it remains to be seen whether Congress's efforts regarding SEC and DOJ actions will be effective.
64 Section 929P is discussed further in the next section, which examines the consequences of treating extraterritoriality as a merits question and the implications of the abrupt departure from the historical treatment of this subject.
M.

Divergent Waves-Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and the Merits
Extraterritoriality has traditionally been dealt with as a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. 65 Morrison, however, held that this approach was not appropriate with regard to section 10(b) . 66 The Court explained that to inquire about extraterritorial reach is really to ask what conduct is prohibited under section 10(b), which goes to the merits of the claim. 67 It stated that subject-matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns a court's "power to hear a case." 68 The differences between a jurisdictional and a merits challenge are discussed below, followed by an exploration of the implications of this change beyond section 10(b).
A. ASSESSING THE STORM-CONSEQUENCES OF JURISDICTIONAL AND MERIT-BASED
CHARACTERIZATIONS
Classifying an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based can impact when a challenge may be brought, who resolves the challenge, and the finality of the resolution.69 For example, a motion based on subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, 7 0 whereas a challenge based on the merits is forfeited if not brought to the court in a timely manner. 71 An instance where this timing may affect the outcome of a case is where a defendant raises an issue for the first time on appeal. 72 Such a challenge will likely be rejected as untimely if the court determines that the issue is based on the merits, rather than that of subjectmatter jurisdiction. 73 Additionally, courts have an independent obligation to determine that subject-matter jurisdiction exists but have no such obligation regarding merit requirements. 74 Thus, a court must inquire into such jurisdictional issues on its own accord. Characterization of an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based also influences whether a judge or a jury will resolve the dispute. 75 Particularly, a judge may weigh evidence concerning contested facts 74. Id. at 514; compare FED. R. Csv. P. 12(h)(3) (stating that "[ilf the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action"), with FED. R. Cirv. P. 12(h)(2) (stating that a "[flailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... may be raised: (A) in any pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); (B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or (C) at trial"). In determining that the ERISA requirement that an employer has fifteen or more employees was a merits rather than jurisdiction issue, the Supreme Court noted that the text of ERISA did not indicate that "Congress intended courts, on their own motion, to assure that the employee-numerosity requirement is met." Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514.
75. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (referring to CHARLES WIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, 5B FEDERAL PRAC-to resolve a dispute concerning subject-matter jurisdiction, whereas a jury is the trier of contested facts when an element of the claim is at issue.
76
The finality of a resolution may also depend on characterization of an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based. A dismissal due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction typically is without prejudice, allowing a plaintiff to bring the claim in an appropriate court. 77 But if a claim is dismissed on the merits, the plaintiff would be precluded from arguing for a different outcome elsewhere.7S Furthermore, the court's characterization of the issue may affect other claims. An appellate court must dismiss the entire complaint if subject-matter jurisdiction is found lacking.7 9 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, on the other hand, allows the court discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant issues.
80
These differences can potentially impact the outcome of litigation. With the exception of potential claim preclusion, the characterization of an issue as merit-based appears to favor plaintiffs. When an issue is deemed a merits question there is a limited time for challenges by defendants, no independent judicial obligation to ensure that merit requirements are met, and a jury to resolve disputes concerning contested facts. It should be noted, however, that a pretrial dismissal usually does not depend on characterization of an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based, as evidenced in Morrison. 8 1 National Australia raised the issue of extraterritorial reach of section 10(b) before trial and therefore had not forfeited a challenge based on the merits. The Court found it unnecessary to remand the case based on the Second Circuit's dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1), instead of dismissal for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6), reasoning that the new labeling would result in the same outcome. where "[tihe plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts"). All this is not to say that an issue that goes to the scope of the conduct covered under the statute can never be a jurisdictional issue. The Supreme Court has stated that Congress has the power to make a threshold limitation on a statute's scope jurisdictional by clearly identifying it as such. 97 To determine whether Congress has exercised this power, the Court has focused on whether the threshold appears in the jurisdictional provision of the statute or if it is accompanied by any jurisdictional language. The defendant argued that the ATS was "stillborn" because the jurisdictional grant did not have a corresponding cause of action. 106 The Supreme Court held that federal common law at the time the ATS was passed in 1789 provided substantive law to support the jurisdictional grant.' 07 In its decision, the Court considered evidence that
Congress intended the statute to have immediate effect upon enactment.
08
While Morrison clearly finds substantive law lacking for the conduct and effect test, courts may draw from Sosa and proceed based on Congress's intent to overrule Morrison, taking into account the brief period in which Congress had to respond to Morrison and the lengthy history of courts treating extraterritorial application as a matter of jurisdiction. Given the uncertainty surrounding section 929P though, Congress (at least in the government enforcement context) should expand the substantive reach of section 10(b) to help ensure that the law is interpreted as Congress intended. 09 Overall, a significant impact of the Morrison declaration that section 10(b) extraterritoriality is a merits question is with respect to the characterization of the statutory requirements of other statutes. Future characterization of extraterritoriality appears particularly susceptible to the reasoning in Morrison, though Congress's ability to make a requirement jurisdictional means that courts cannot assume that a merits question under one statute is necessarily a merits question under another statute. As for the future of the Dodd-Frank amendment, the potential problems seem to lie in the substantive limitations of the Exchange Act, not with Congress's jurisdictional characterization of extraterritoriality. The impact of Morrison's extraterritoriality analysis on other federal law is examined next.
IV. Wave Impact-Extraterritoriality with Regard to Other Federal Law
In Morrison, the Supreme Court stated that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of construction that applies generally to the legislation of Congress.I 0 The Court explained that this presumption rests on the perception that Congress usually legislates with regard to domestic, rather than foreign, concerns."' Thus, unless Congress clearly indicates that a statute has extraterritorial reach, courts should presume the statute does not apply abroad. Prior to Morrison, several circuit courts adopted the conduct and effects test to determine the extraterritorial application of RICO.11S For example, the Ninth Circuit, upon finding that RICO is silent as to extraterritorial application, reasoned that the securities laws' conduct and effects test was useful in determining RICO's extraterritorial applicaion. 116 The Eleventh Circuit, after rejecting the assertion that RICO does not apply extraterritorially without an explicit statement to that effect, also adopted the conduct and effects test. 171 Accordingly, the court turned to its three-factor test for proper extraterritorial application under that Act, which provides that:
(1) the alleged violations must create some effect on American foreign commerce; (2) the effect must be sufficiently great to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs under the Lanham Act; and (3) the interests of and links to American foreign commerce must be sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify assertion of extraterritorial authority.
72
Applying the test, the court held that "all relevant acts occurred abroad" 173 and that Love failed to provide evidence of monetary injury in the United States caused by such acts. 174 The CD was conceived and manufactured overseas and was never sold or distributed in the United States. 175 Therefore, although the Lanham Act was deemed to have extraterritorial application, the claims in Love were dismissed based on the Ninth Circuit's test limiting the extent of that application. 176 163. Id. at 118 (commenting that when the defendant is a U.S. citizen, "the domestic effect of the international activities may be of lesser importance and a lesser showing of domestic effects may be all that is needed"). Cf. id. at 120 ("We hold that the Lanham Act grants subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct by foreign defendants only where the conduct has a substantial effect on United States commerce.") (emphasis added A number of observations can be made concerning the various courts' treatment of the Lanham Act's extraterritorial application. The Love decision offers a glimpse of a statute that has been deemed to have extraterritorial application in large part due to its definition of "commerce."' 17 7 When the petitioners in Morrison argued that section 10(b) applied abroad because "interstate commerce" was defined to encompass "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication... between any foreign country and any state," the Court responded that it has repeatedly held that statutes with broad language defining "commerce" do not have extraterritorial application, even in instances where "foreign commerce" was expressly included in the definition. Overall, even though the presumption against extraterritoriality is not a new canon of statutory construction, Morrison has created a more difficult environment for plaintiffs to bring claims involving U.S. and foreign contacts. Defendants will bring more FRCP 12(b)(6) challenges regarding extraterritorial application, asserting that either the statute at issue does not have extraterritorial reach or that the U.S. contacts are insufficient to state a claim. Indeed, in light of Morrison, use of the conduct and effects test in other areas of law that are not "textually plausible"' 9 is susceptible to being overruled.' 91 The fature will likely be shaped by courts focusing on the language and objectives of a statute and developing tests therefrom. 92 An absence of statutory direction regarding conflicts with foreign laws will weigh in favor of a more limiting test. 
A. THE FIRST WAVE-PURCHASE OR SALE OF A SECURITY LISTED ON A U.S.
EXCHANGE
Under the first prong of the Morrison transactional test, a purchase or sale of a security listed on a domestic exchange is subject to section 10(b).
8
The inquiry under this prong focuses on the circumstances in which the listing requirement is met. 199 In this respect, there are two ways that foreign companies seek to access capital markets through U.S. exchanges. First, ordinary shares, which are the foreign equivalent of common stock, may be listed on U.S. exchanges to trade as a U.S. company's stock normally would. Overall, the listing of foreign stock directly, or the representation of foreign stock through ADRs, on a U.S. exchange alone is not enough to warrant section 10(b) coverage under the Morrison transactional test. To satisfy the listing requirement of the first prong of the test, courts have required that the transaction at issue take place on a U.S. exchange. Purchases of ADRs on a domestic exchange come within section 10(b) coverage. On the other hand, U.S. investors who purchase or sell securities outside of this country, whether on a stock exchange, over-the-counter, or in private transactions, are left without a section 10(b) claim unless they can show that, pursuant to the second prong of the transactional test, the purchase or sale was made in the United States. The next section explores the scope of transactions covered by the second prong.
B. A MORE TUMULTUOUS WAVE-PURCHASE OR SALE OF ANY OTHER SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The second prong of the Morrison transactional test raises a host of questions. In addressing this prong, the Supreme Court referenced "purchases or sales made in the United States" as well as "domestic transactions."
214 Unfortunately, this terminology fails to provide sufficient light on the type of transactions that qualify under the second prong. Perhaps due to this lack of guidance, there is already a wealth of case law interpreting this terminology. 2 15
Many attempts by plaintiffs to satisfy the second prong of the Morrison transactional test have failed. 216 One of the arguments not surprisingly rejected by courts is that a purchase of stock on a foreign exchange is a domestic transaction because the purchase was made by a U.S. resident.217 Nothing in Morrison indicates that for section 10(b) purposes the location of a transaction turns on a purchaser's residency or citizenship. 2 1 8 As one court observed, "a foreign resident can make a purchase within the United States, and a United States resident can make a purchase outside the United States," but section 10(b) only reaches the former. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 225 the SEC referenced Goldman Sachs's actions in the United States in an attempt to state section 10(b) claims that involved purchases of notes by a German bank and sales of credit default swaps by a Netherlands bank. 226 The alleged deceptive conduct included transmission of false and misleading marketing materials and emails. The court dismissed the claims, explaining that domestic conduct is no longer the test for section 10(b) liability. 2 27 As Morrison reasons, "[s]ection 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct," but only transactions that take place in the United States that involve deceptive conduct committed "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered." 2 28
Likewise, assertions that a transaction ought to be considered a domestic transaction where the decision to invest was made in the United States have proven futile. One court reasoned that allowing claims just because "some acts that ultimately result [ed] in the execution of the transaction abroad [took] place in the United States" would only serve to revive the rejected conduct test.
32
Several plaintiffs have advocated a seemingly more persuasive position that also has met with failure thus far, contending that purchase orders placed in the United States for stock listed on a foreign exchange are domestic transactions under Morrison. 233 As one court reasoned, "the Exchange Act was not intended to regulate foreign exchanges" and that, due to the potential for conflicts with foreign law, "United States securities laws should defer to the law of the country where the security is exchanged.
' 234 Based on Morrison's rationale, therefore, it may well be that transactions effected on foreign exchanges can never be domestic transactions coming within section 10(b) coverage.
After having gone through the rejected bases for defining a domestic transaction-that is, residency or citizenship, location where injury occurred, location of deceptive conduct, location of investment decision, and location where the purchase orders were placed-it is time to examine a basis that has yielded inconsistent responses from courts. The theory that domestic transactions under the second prong of Morrison referred to "purchases and sales of securities explicitly solicited by the issuer within the United States" was first suggested and adopted in Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., 235 a memorandum opinion designating a lead plaintiff for a securities class action suit. Thus, it appears that courts will not presume that parties incurred irrevocable liability at the closing, even though that may often be the case.
2 58
Other interpretations of "domestic transactions" under Morrison have considered the location where the subscription agreements were accepted. 259 For instance, in Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 26 0 a case brought by foreign investors against Bernie Madoffis foreign feeder funds, the plaintiffs argued that the second prong of the Morrison transactional test was met because, although they sent their subscription agreements to foreign administrators, a transaction did not occur until the agreements were accepted in the defendants' New York offices.
26 1 With no securities purchases or sales "executed on a foreign exchange," the court stated that Anwar entailed a "novel and more complex application of Morrison's transactional test." 262 The court concluded that, given the unique financial interests, transaction structures, and party relationships involved, more facts were needed to determine if plaintiffs' purchases occurred in the United States.
263
To consider the location where the subscription agreement was accepted is consistent with the irrevocable liability analysis. Acceptance of an agreement presumably forms a contract that makes the parties liable to each other if they fail to pay for or deliver the ("I am loathe to crecae a rule that would make foreign issuers with little relationship to the U.S. subject to suits here simply because a private party in this country entered into a derivatives contract that references the foreign issuer's stock. Such a holding would turn Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality on its head."). One commentary expressed concern that this approach "would likely deny all purchasers of ADRs a remedy under Likewise, the focus with respect to over-the-counter ADRs should be on whether the ADR was purchased in the United States. By focusing instead on the foreign shares underlying these securities, the familiarity of the market where the ADRs are traded, and the number of U.S. resident purchasers, the court in Socift Generale misapplied Nonetheless, the interpretation of "domestic transactions" that seems to best comport with Morrison and the Exchange Act is the irrevocable liability analysis. That analysis takes into account the statutory meaning of the words "purchase" and "sale" and does not revive aspects of the rejected conduct and effects test, as a focus on "solicitation" would. Although the facts needed to establish proof of irrevocable liability in a given situation frequently may not be clear, mutual acceptance of the agreement's terms and conditions in the United States should be important. As for whether parties can invoke U.S. federal securities law based on contractual language alone, it appears they cannot. They may, however, be able to opt into section 10(b) coverage if contractual language provides that the closing and title transfer occur in the United States and the parties then perform accordingly. With that possibility looming, it seems that the transactional test may produce results that Morrison did not foresee.
The last section considers private right of actions after Morrison and whether the emerging globalization of securities markets calls for action by Congress.
C. THE ULTIMATE WAVE-PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTIONS AFTER MORRISON
In response to the study called for in the Dodd-Frank Act, parties ranging from foreign governments to pension funds to law professors have weighed in on whether Congress ought to reinstate some form of the conduct and effects test for private right of actions under section 10(b). 293 Five Ohio pension funds assert that U.S. and European Union brokers are required by legislation to execute purchases and sales on the exchange that, under the circumstances, most benefits the client.
2 94 Investors therefore have no idea through which exchange(s) their orders will be directed.295 Additionally, many states mandate that state pension funds engage in prudent diversification.296 For some funds, this requires the purchase of securities on foreign exchanges.297 Several funds contend that a private right of action for U.S. investors, regardless of where the affected securities transaction(s) are consummated, is essential to effectuate the Exchange Act's primary purpose of protecting investors.
298
A comment by a group of forty-two law professors also supports extending section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act to private plaintiffs. 299 The professors argued that, with the fluid and international nature of modem financial markets, the place of a trade is becoming increasingly arbitrary. 300 For instance, they predicted that the proposed merger of the 302. Bartlett, stpra note 287, at 7 (arguing that "[i]f a person in the U.S. is approached by brokers in the U.S. and is led to execute a trade on a foreign exchange, surely that trade is territorial, not extraterritorial"). In urging the Commission to reflect on the benefits of reinstating the conduct and effects test, the professors suggested that the Commission "consider analogies to Regulation S's 'directed selling efforts"' and "the extent of trading in categories of economically equivalent instruments," such as ADRs and swaps backed by foreign shares. The Commission issued its report based on the Dodd-Frank study in April 2012. 306 Rather than recommend a particular course of action, the Commission put forth several alternatives regarding private right of actions for Congressional consideration. 307 These alternatives ranged from extending the conduct and effects test that Congress granted the Commission and DOJ in the Dodd-Frank Act, 30 8 to supplementing and clarifying the second prong of the Morrison transaction test, 30 9 to taking no action at all. 31 0 Issuing a dissenting statement on the report, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar expressed his "strong disappointment," citing the report's lack of any specific recommendations and its failure to accurately portray the "immense and irreparable investor harm" resulting from In the SEC comments submitted by the various parties, the main disagreement appears to concern whether section 10(b) coverage ought to be available to U.S. investors who purchased or sold securities of foreign issuers. In that situation, the United States has an interest in protecting U.S. investors, while a foreign government has an interest in policing issuers within its country. The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law observes that, with the increasing globalization of securities markets, territorial factors may become less relevant. 312 Conversely, the place of representations and negotiations, 313 the nationality and residency of the parties, 314 and the effect of the transaction or conduct on U.S. markets and investors 3 5 become more important.
316
Clearly, the locale of a transaction will become increasingly irrelevant if international exchange mergers become widespread. If the Exchange Act is to adequately protect U.S. investors and markets in the future, non-territorial factors, such as those set forth in the Restatement, must play a pivotal role in determining the scope of the section 10(b) private right of action. 317 For these reasons, Congress needs to reconsider the substantive scope of section 10(b) as applied to transactions consummated abroad.
VI. Conclusion
Morrison has significant ramifications. Overall, the decision (1) altered the longstanding treatment of extraterritoriality as a jurisdictional issue; (2) rendered it more difficult to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality under federal law; and (3) dramatically narrowed the scope of section 10(b) with respect to transnational frauds. The first two changes primarily have affected federal law outside of U.S. securities law. Statutory requirements are being scrutinized after Morrison to ensure that they are not incorrectly characterized as jurisdictional issues. Additionally, Morrison's strict approach to the presumption against extraterritoriality is driving discussions where a statute's extraterritorial reach is unsettled. It is the creation of the transactional test, however, that will have the most lasting reverberations on the legal tapestry. Both securities law and non-securities law have been impacted by the transactional test, but in very different ways. The focus in securities law will be gaining an understanding of what it means to have a "domestic transaction" under Morrison. This may entail development of the irrevocable liability analysis and possibly some incorporation of contract law concepts. On the whole, with respect to private rights of action, it can be said that the transactional test sets a much higher threshold for section 10(b) claims than the now defunct conduct and effects test ever did.
As for non-securities law, Morrison can be expected to guide the important development of the standards that instruct courts as to the proper application of a statute. RICO is likely the first of many statutes to be examined by courts in accordance with the process set forth in Morrison-that is, the process of first identifying the focus of a statute based on its statutory language and legislative history and then deciphering a minimum-U.S.-contact test in accordance with that focus, all the while being mindful of the presumption against extraterritoriality. With the globalization of finance and business markets, ascertaining the requisite U.S. nexus under an applicable statute will become increasingly critical in discerning the boundaries of U.S. law. 314. Id. § 416(2)(c). This factor may be particularly important when seeking to protect members of the United States armed forces stationed abroad. Id. at rptr. note 2.
315. See id. § 41 6 ( 2 )(a) (considering "whether the transaction or conduct has, or can reasonably be expected to have, a substantial effect on a securities market in the United States for securities of the same issuer or on holdings in such securities by United States nationals or residents"). 316. Id. § 416 cmt. a. 317. Under the Restatement, it would be reasonable for the United States to exercise jurisdiction based on representations made in the United States and for the protection of a U.S. investor. See id. § 416(2)(b)-(c), cmt. a. This is not to say that the application of foreign law would be inappropriate. As in blue sky law, the transaction may have sufficient connection to both U.S. and foreign law to warrant application of either law. See Joseph C. Long, 12 BLUE SKY LAW § 4.1 (2010).
